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Abstract
There is a disconnect between explanatory artificial intelligence (XAI) methods
and the types of explanations that are useful for and demanded by society (policy
makers, government officials, etc.) Questions that experts in artificial intelligence
(AI) ask opaque systems provide inside explanations, focused on debugging, re-
liability, and validation. These are different from those that society will ask of
these systems to build trust and confidence in their decisions. Although explana-
tory AI systems can answer many questions that experts desire, they often don’t
explain why they made decisions in a way that is precise (true to the model) and
understandable to humans. These outside explanations can be used to build trust,
comply with regulatory and policy changes, and act as external validation. In
this paper, we focus on XAI methods for deep neural networks (DNNs) because
of DNNs’ use in decision-making and inherent opacity. We explore the types
of questions that explanatory DNN systems can answer and discuss challenges
in building explanatory systems that provide outside explanations for societal re-
quirements and benefit.
1 Introduction
There has been a recent surge of work in explanatory artificially intelligent (XAI) systems. One
reason these systems are gaining traction is due to changes in policy, law, and regulation. Indeed,
with the rise of AI-based decision making in areas of societal interest–from finance and employment
to driving and journalism–policymakers see the need to discuss certain standards around XAI.
For example, the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) creates obligations
for automatic decision making processes [11], with a provision including right to explanation. This
broad obligation puts the burden on those who process data with (and develop for) AI systems to
generate reasonable explanations for their systems’ decision making processes. We can also observe
broad societal concerns with issues of AI liability [33]. For example, as autonomous vehicles are
being introduced, we need a better understanding of what happened in the case of an accident (as it
has already happened [5]). How can there be an appropriate investigation process if opaque decision-
making algorithms are involved? How can we ensure that these machines are acting in our best
interest?
AI algorithms and more general, complex AI systems cannot currently provide answers to these
prior questions. These algorithms and systems are not built to explain to the general public nor
policy-makers. Although there have been calls for work on creating systems and algorithms that
can interpret [7, 27] and explain [12] some parts of their decisions, the current state-of-the-art ex-
planatory systems are made for the programmer or expert, not an end user or policy-maker. The key
difference here is that the current systems produce what we refer to as inside explanations. They
point to a plausible technical explanation, either by looking at the relationships between the inputs
and outputs of a model, or examining the role of individual parts, or by producing a surface-level
explanation itself. Crucially, though, these explanations do not answer why questions. Continuing
with the autonomous vehicle example, when an accident happens involving this autonomous ma-
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chine, police officials, insurance companies, and the people who are harmed will want to know who
or what is accountable for the accident and why it happened.
In this paper, we examine the types of questions that explanatory DNN algorithms can and cannot
answer. We focus on DNNs specifically because of the recent shift in AI research from symbolic
approaches to machine learning and deep learning 1, and because these are the systems are making
safety-critical decisions in applications like autonomous driving[3] and malware detection[35]. In
order to bridge the gap between the current, technical deep neural network explanations (which we
refer to as inside explanations) and the explanations that answer why questions that would benefit
society (which we refer to as outside explanations) we must develop explanations for DNNs that can
answer these questions and be probed. We extend the work of a previously defined [10] taxonomy
of explanations by looking at the specific questions each class can and cannot answer, and stress the
necessity and technical challenges for these systems to be probed and answer why questions. We
motivate future work on bridging the gap between current explainable methods by incorporating the
types of questions and explanations society would like to know.
By doing this, we attempt to “bridge the gap” between current, technical deep neural network expla-
nations and explanations that answer why questions beneficial to society. We approach this task in
four main ways:
• We differentiate between inside (technical) and outside (why) explanations.
• We extend the work of a previously defined [10] taxonomy of explanations by looking at
the specific questions each class can and cannot answer.
• We discuss the necessity of probing of AI systems and the technical challenges inherent in
creating outside explanations.
• We motivate future work on bridging the gap between current explainable methods by
incorporating the types of questions and explanations society would like to know.
2 Related Work
In this work, we focus on the types of questions and explanations that explanatory DNN methods
can answer. Recent work has looked at ways to correct neural network judgments [36] and different
ways to audit such networks by detecting biases [32]. But these judgments are not enough to com-
pletely understand the model’s decisions-making. Other work answers why questions by finding
similar data points [4]. Although these methods are clearly interpretable, they do not provide any
unique insights into why the model made those decisions. Other work examining best practices for
explanation [30] provides a set of categories, but does not evaluate the questions that explanatory
systems should be able to answer; which is necessary for policy makers and societal trust in DNN
decision processes.
Since we are interested in the societal expectation of explanations, it is important to examine prior
initiatives on the legal side. The desire for explanations in certain sectors is not new. For example,
the U.S. Fair Credit Reporting Act creates obligations for transparency in certain financial decision-
making processes, even if they are automated [17]. The role of explanation has been examined to
enforce accountability under the law [8]. Similar recommendations in using explanations in law
have been examined in promoting ethics for design [23], for privacy [24], and liability for machines
[33].
In this paper, we explicitly examine DNNs, even though there have been important developments
in explanatory systems not tailored to DNNs, such as randomized importance [20], rule lists [19],
partial dependence plots [9, 22, 37], Shapely scores [22, 31], and Bayesian case based models [15].
3 Definitions
We follow from previous work [10] that a proper explanation should be both interpretable and com-
plete. By intepretable, we mean that the explanation should be understandable to humans. That
does not necessarily imply that the explanation must be in human-readable form, in fact, visual cues
are well-understood by humans. When we say that the methods must be complete, we mean the
resulting explanation should be true to the model. For example, while using a simplified model that
1http://www.aiindex.org/2017-report.pdf
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Table 1: Strengths, Benefits, and Challenges of Current DNN XAI systems
Method Questions it can answer Questions it cannot answer
Processing Why does this particular input
lead to this particular output?
Why were these inputs most impor-
tant to the output? How could the
output be changed?
Representation What information does the
network contain?
Why is a representation relevant for
the outputs? How was this represen-
tation learned?
Explanation Given a particular output What information contributed to
this
producing or decision, how can the net-
work explain its behavior?
output/decision? How can the
network yield a different out-
put/decision?
is explainable (like a linear model) to fit the input to the output results in a nice explanation, it is
not a true and complete representation of the internal concepts, representations, and decisions of the
model.
In this paper, we refer to inside and outside explanations for explaining DNNs. When we refer to
inside explanations, we are referring to the type of explanations that currently exist, that are catered
towards AI developers and experts. They are tailored to people inside the field. We encourage the
development of outside explanations that are interpretable, complete, and answer why questions.
They build trust not only to their technical developers, but also those outside the technical scope that
may use their technology without a technical background.
4 Current Limitations
To show the strengths, benefits, and challenges of current explanatory approaches for opaque, DNN
systems, we use a previously defined taxonomy [10] . The taxonomy consists of 3 classes. The first
class are systems that explain processing by looking at the relationships between the inputs and the
outputs. These include salience mapping [29, 38], decision trees [39], automatic rule-extraction [1],
and influence functions [16]. The second class are systems that explain representation for DNNs ei-
ther in terms of layers [26, 34], neurons [2] or vectors [14]. The final class is explanation-producing
systems that look at attention-based visual question answers [25] or disentangled representations
[28] to create self-explaining systems.
When examining this taxonomy for policy purposes, the biggest shortcoming is that these systems
cannot explain why. There are two types of questions that we should ask of a decision making
algorithm:
1. Why did this output happen?
2. How could this output have changed?
A summary of the types of questions that current DNN XAI systems can and cannot answer are in
Table 1. Explanation producing systems nearly answer the first question we would want to ask a
decision making algorithm: why did this output happen? But the problem is that their explanation
may not be complete and true to the model’s internal decisions and processes. In order to illustrate
the necessity of answering these questions, we proceed by walking-through examples of an AI al-
gorithm, a larger AI system, and illustrate problems with data to motivate why explanatory systems
should strive to answer the preceding questions.
4.1 Societal needs for explanations
Imagine you do not receive a loan, you would want to know what was the key attribute that limited
the algorithm. You would want to know why you were denied a loan. But further, you may also
want a sensitivity analysis: what would you need to change to be able to get the loan. There may
be several possibilities. For example, you may have received a loan if you made $1,000 more per
month; something you may be able to change in the future. However, other factors may be things
you cannot control, such as the specific time you applied or your gender or ethnicity. So, in this
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case, we would like to have system that is able to explain why it decided to give or not a loan to each
person.
Moreover, consider again the AI system example mentioned earlier of a self-driving car involved in
an accident. The first thing we would want to know is why the accident happened. In this case there
are many algorithms interacting. Finding if there was a faulty component is extremely challenging,
making it even more relevant for each part of the system to be able to explain its decisions. In the
recent Uber accident where the vehicle struck and killed a pedestrian, detecting the root-cause of the
accident took several weeks to uncover in the complex AI software system [21].
But the other, more challenging question we would want to ask is if the accident could have been
avoided. This is a more difficult question than the previous, single algorithm question. In complex
systems, an error could be local (caused by a single failure), or it could be caused by an inconsistency
between parts working together. The latter is much more difficult to detect, diagnosis, and explain.
In the Uber case, since the accident was deemed to be caused by a false positive[18] on the error
detection monitoring the pedestrian, several explanations could provide evidence of how this could
have been avoided. Again, some inconsistencies are easier to fix than others (which may not be
possible). Perhaps the sensitivity on the error detection monitor should be decreased or increased.
Or perhaps the pedestrian would have been detected with higher certainty during the daytime, or if
they were walking slower. It is still left to question whether the training data was at fault, which
introduces a new set of questions.
4.2 The risk of opaque models
Generally explaining model behavior is not enough to build trust in these sorts of models. Another
way these algorithms and systems can behave badly is due to a inconsistency in the training data
and/or knowledge bases. This does not necessarily mean that the training data is “bad” per say,
but that there is a misalignment between the expected data and the actual training data used. We
have seen this recently with the Amazon recruiting algorithm [6]. This algorithm was eventually
disbanded because the results were extremely biased; since the algorithm had been trained on ap-
plicants data for the past 10 years (where males are dominant), it was teaching itself to choose
male candidates. Even if the algorithm was modified, there was no way to ensure it was unbiased.
Although this is an extremely compelling case for inquisitive explanatory systems, an even more
persuasive case is for safety-critical tasks.
Equally important, consider a machine learning classifier to diagnose breast cancer from an image,
where the training set was carefully selected to be fairly close to a 50-50 split of breast cancer and
non-breast cancer scans. Even if the classifier is very accurate, without having access to complete
explanations to understand how decisions are made in the model, it is not certain that it is making
decisions for the right reasons—the model may in fact, learn a feature it should not rely on despite
predicting breast cancer very accurately. In [13], one classifier learned the resolution of the scanner
camera, therefore predicting cancerous images from a high resolution very accurately. Figuring out
this sort of data problem is extremely difficult. It requires either an attuned intuition of the model’s
inner workings or the model to be able to answer questions to do a fine-grain sensitivity analysis.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
As humans, we start to build trust by asking questions. We should be able to judge the behavior of
opaque DNN algorithms by asking similar questions as we would ask of a person’s behavior in simi-
lar circumstances. The key idea here is that explainability exceeds transparency and interpretability,
to empower the public to understand the decisions and underlying mechanisms.
We have focused mainly on explainable DNN algorithms, but when a DNN algorithm is a part of a
larger system, explainability is not enough. Explainability does not necessary imply that complex
systems are accountable and responsible; this may have to be tackled with other requirements. For
example, a system can provide an “outside” explanation without addressing who or what is responsi-
ble and why. At the same time, an explainable system may be transparent without being receptive to
human feedback. In future work, we will examine how explainability may interact with other parts
of systems (including the human operator or user) to produce systems that can be augmented and
learn from feedback.
But in order to truly trust AI systems, people will not only need to feel confident that they understand
certain how decisions are made, but also that they have recourse. If a person disagrees with a
system’s output, they should be empowered and able to change the system. Designing explainable
AI is important, but only when opaque systems are auditable, explainable, answer questions, and
interpret feedback will we be confident enough to trust their decision-making.
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